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Abstract





In this paper I examine the epidemiologist’s Potential Outcomes Approach (POA) to causation. The POA shares many qualities with the counterfactual conceptions of causation found in traditional analytic philosophy (Lewis  1974), as the methodology always implies that the effect of an exposure is measured relative to some contrary-to-fact condition – it is unsurprising, then, that some epidemiologists advanced the POA as a conceptual analysis of causation in its own right; that is, a means of judging whether a specified exposure should or should not be deemed a cause of a specified outcome. In S2 I first outline the general POA strategy, and its similarities and differences with the counterfactual conceptions of causation most analytic philosophers are acquainted with; I argue that although there are similarities, the connections between the philosophical and epidemiological counterfactual approaches have been greatly exaggerated. I then demonstrate that for some common parameters, if the POA did succeed as a conceptual analysis of causation, it would do so as a frequentist probability raising account. In S3 I present Broadbent’s characterisation of the POA, and outline his argument that the POA analysis of causation involves both circular and false hypotheses – I then attempt to refute these objections; In S4, however, I provide two further reasons for rejecting the POA as a coherent causal analysis for the epidemiologist: first, the POA dictates that only well-defined interventions are causally relevant, and epidemiological studies have already shown the importance of nonmanipulable causes; and second, clinical medicine very often requires practitioners to take nonmanipulable causal conditions seriously.
Although I believe Broadbent’s worries can be diffused by implementing a broadly Popperian scientific method, the POA should not be viewed as a good conceptual analysis of causation ‘in general’, for the reasons I will provide in S4; however, I argue the epidemiologist’s POA strategy implies it was never meant to be a general analysis of causation. The POA is a tool designed to measure the effect of interventions, not to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for causation in epidemiology simpliciter. In short, although positive POA measurements (in the right conditions) provide evidence of causal relationships between exposures and outcomes, the POA is a strategy for measuring effects, not causes, and thus cannot be criticised for ruling all nonmanipulable events non-causal, as it does no such thing.
2.1	Counterfactuals and The Potential Outcomes Approach
 Epidemiologists are usually concerned with studies confirming or falsifying general causal claims such as ‘smoking causes cancer’, or ‘the Plasmodium vivax malaria transmission is more resilient to interruption than other forms of malaria’ (Mendis et al, 2009) - not so for the contemporary analytic philosopher. Philosophers of science and those metaphysicians working in counterfactual conceptions of causation are more often interested in well-specified token events (eg. ‘Joe’s contracting malaria’); this is exemplified by Hume’s doctrine that one ‘object’/event causes another where ‘if the first object had not been, the second never existed’ (Hume, 1999, 146) – let us call this approach the ‘Lewisian conception​[1]​’. The distinction between the singular and general causal claims seems to have gone unnoticed in the epidemiology literature, and so the ties between Hume and Lewis’s conditional (counterfactual) accounts and the epidemiologist’s POA have been grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, proponents of the POA adopt a similar strategy to the Lewisian, in that they judge causal effects based not only on the actual outcomes of a patient’s actual exposure, but the potential outcomes of alternative, unrealised exposures on the same patient(s) - assigning the phrase ‘counterfactual’ account thus seems appropriate to both the Lewisian conception, and the POA. 
The Lewisian conception is ultimately an attempt at outlining the necessary and sufficient conditions for causes, and his proposal (in its simplest form) is straight forward: very crudely, some token event X causes some token event Y only if X makes a difference; that is, if both X and Y occur, and if, in a possible world identical to the actual world until the moment X occurs, were X not to occur (and the world were left to evolve according to the laws of nature of the actual world), then Y would not occur​[2]​. This conception alone is of little use to the epidemiologist, of course, since moving from just a single causal inference of the kind identified by the Lewisian method, to general causal inferences about the effects of actions like smoking, immunisation, and exercise, would clearly be unjustified. 
The POA process is similar to that the Lewisian adopts in some respects, but very different in others; it is similar insofar as it deals with unobservable contrary-to-fact situations, but distinct not only in respect of the kind of causal claims they make, but in a manner suggested by the name epidemiologists assign the view: the POA is concerned with many ‘potential outcomes’ (whereby outcomes can be a number of variables, including incidence rates, life expectancy, and so on), the values of which are determined through (a) actual group studies, and (b) estimates of the outcomes of counterfactual studies; that is, not only whether or not the actual outcome occurs given the non-occurrence of the actual exposure, but specific data concerning outcomes under a number of possible contrary-to-fact exposures. The strategy thus runs roughly as follows:
There are a number of possible actions, only one of which is actual; take the actual action of an individual or population to be x0, and all alternative exposures to that individual or population to be uniquely specified: x1, x2, x3, and so on.
(i)	Take O to be a measure of outcome, and O(x0) to be the outcome of the observable event x0. O(xn) for all values of n except 0 are unobservable – they are the counterfactual outcomes. All outcomes O(xn) are potential outcomes.
(ii)	Compare the actual outcome O(x0) with any one counterfactual outcome O(xc), to measure the of x0 versus O(xc)      
Outcomes other than O(x0) are contrary-to-fact and thus unobservable, but reasonable estimation (assuming this is possible) of these values admits of numerous effect-measures (for example, if one takes x0 to be ‘immunised against yellow fever’, and x1 to be ‘not immunised against yellow fever’, one can calculate the risk of yellow fever ratio due to non-immunisation versus immunisation by O(x1)/O(x0)). 
Note here a further important difference between the Lewisian conception of causation and the POA, namely, that the strategy employed implies that it is meaningless to assert that ‘non-immunisation is a cause simpliciter of yellow-fever’ – one must first determine which intervention/action it is relative to: one must assert that ‘non-immunisation causes yellow fever versus immunisation’. This leads to some surprising consequences. For example, unprotected penile-vaginal sex (where H.I.V. is prevalent) is a cause of H.I.V. versus abstinence; but it is not a cause of H.I.V. versus unprotected anal sex (where H.I.V. is prevalent) – indeed, relative to unprotected anal sex, unprotected penile-vaginal sex reduces risk of H.I.V. However, as will become evident in S3.3, the counterfactual scenarios employed play an important role in what predictive knowledge is yielded by the POA’s causal claims.   
2.2 The Potential Outcomes Approach as a Probability-Raising Account of Causation
Although to my knowledge this has not been discussed elsewhere, if one considers the POA a conceptual analysis of causation (that is, an attempt to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for causal relationships between exposures and outcomes), cause-identification via risk-parameter measurement (and comparison) can be a notational variant of the frequentist probability-raising account of cause, similar to that proposed by Hans Reichenbach (1956). To establish a causal relationship using risk-parameters, where x is a specified population, one measures whether an effect is more probable given a well-defined intervention by calculating the outcome O(x0) (say, risk of morbidity), and the counterfactual outcome of the same parameter O(x1), and comparing the two. Risk is equivalent to frequentist probability (the number of cases/population at the start of the study), so if the risk of morbidity given x0 is higher than the risk given x1, that is, P(D|x0) > P(D|x1)​[3]​, according to the Reichenbach probability-raising account of cause, x0 is to be deemed a cause of disease D (given the nature of the POA, one must specify that x0 is a cause relative to x1, of course).
            It is worth noting that often this simplified model will present ‘spurious correlations’ as causal relationships as a result of confounding factors; Reichenbach provides an answer to this problem, refining his conceptual analysis of cause roughly as follows:

REICH
Where: if P(E | A & C) = P(E | C), then C is said to screen A off from E, Ct is a cause of Et′ if and only if:
1.      P(Et′ | Ct) > P(Et′ | ~Ct); and
2.      There is no further event Bt″, occurring at a time t″ earlier than or simultaneously with t, that screens Et′ off from Ct            (Hitchcock, 2010)
This seems to deal with the two problems mentioned above, but given REICH’s reference to particular times, the solution looks suitable only for accounts of singular causation, and as I have emphasised, unlike the counterfactual accounts philosophers are used to discussing, the epidemiologist’s counterfactuals are general causal claims, not singular ones.
One might think that the probabilities contained within the POA risk calculations at a population level derive from individually considered cases of singular causation, so the problem is illusory (suppose one is investigating individual x’s smoking, x0, comparing the counterfactual situation of x not smoking, x1, and that O(x0) is lung cancer. One concludes that smoking caused x’s cancer, since given the low probability, one takes O(x1) to be no cancer. These results, on the face of it, feed into the risk of disease in any population containing x, and can be used in the POA analysis).  However, this response is troublesome for both epistemic and methodological reasons. According to REICH, whether or not an individual’s cancer is caused by smoking depends on whether smoking increased her chance of getting lung cancer, but the risk (the epidemiologist’s equivalent of frequentist probability) of lung cancer given smoking depends on the frequency of lung cancer given smoking. Thus the answers to singular causation questions depend on the answers to general causation questions, and vice versa – the response does not, then, help the epidemiologist. 
            That said, the epidemiologist’s problem is not of the same ilk as Reichenbach’s. In general, proponents of the POA take the confounders problem to be dealt with by randomisation, or when randomisation is unavailable, studies that best accommodate exchangeability, positivity, and consistency. The confounders problem for epidemiologists is thus a methodological one, and is to be dealt with through careful study-design. This short, one sentence response will hardly satisfy most readers, but the confounders problem is one that plagues epidemiological methods of all kinds.
Both the Reichenbach and Lewisian views discussed are accounts of singular causation, but they are clearly distinct; yet the POA, if we are to read it as a conceptual analysis of causation, is as similar to the Reichenbach view as it is to the Lewisian (for risk-parameters, at least). The similarity to the Lewisian view rests on the use of counterfactuals, insofar as effect-measurements require statistics for outcomes under hypothetical scenarios. The similarity to the Reichenbach view rests on effect-measurements being made through the epidemiological equivalent to relative-probabilities; that is, by comparing the value of some parameter that plays the ‘probability of the effect given the (proposed) cause’-role, and the value of the same parameter equivalent to the ‘probability of the effect without the (proposed) cause’​[4]​ (note, however, that not all ‘difference-makers’ are parameters equivalent to frequentist probability, so not all effect-measures will be notational variants of the probability-raising account). The POA is unlike both views, however, in that its purpose is to answer general causal questions, and further, that many problems encountered by the two philosophical analyses of singular causation must be dealt with methodologically by the epidemiologist. It remains true, of course, that confounding is a recurrent problem for epidemiological studies, even given the known methodological approaches to deal with it, but this is an issue for all epidemiological techniques, so a detailed discussion of confounding is not within the scope of this paper​[5]​. 
I do not invite the reader to identify the numerous counterexamples to my simplistic exposition of Reichenbach’s probability-raising conception, or that of Lewis’s counterfactual theory (largely as more comprehensive expositions of both theses are more defensible)​[6]​. The exposition I have provided of both views, however, are sufficiently close to the more refined versions to establish the following claims: (i) that the Lewisian conception is an account of singular causation, whereas the epidemiologist’s POA must, just for pragmatic purposes, be an account of general causation; (ii) they are alike insofar as both involve consideration of contrary-to-fact suppositions, as well as one observable outcome; (iii) the POA only provides effect-measures due to the exposure versus an alternative specified (counterfactual) condition; and (iv) that in essence, when using risk-measurements, a POA analysis of cause is can be viewed as a probability-raising account similar to the Reichenbach’s, but again, different insofar as the POA is concerned with general causal statements, and there are alternative parameters epidemiologists use (such as life expectancy) which do not fit well with a probability-raising conception. We shall see later, however, that the POA is more concerned with causal effect measures, than with conceptual analyses of causation.
3.1	Hernan and Taubman’s Potential Outcomes Approach
Epidemiology is a prescriptive discipline, directed at improving public health through group studies. Given its prescriptive nature, prima facie epidemiologists need only be concerned with manipulable conditions – if one cannot prevent a condition being satisfied, and one cannot interfere with a condition as a form of treatment, one may as well consider it causally redundant. To illustrate: it would be odd to consider ‘being male’ a cause of testicular cancer, even though only males contract the disease; many of those who consider the POA a conception of causation would argue this is because ‘being male’ is a nonmanipulable condition in the population susceptible to the disease (it might be sensible, however, to study the relationship between testosterone levels and testicular cancer, as testosterone levels can be interfered with).  On the face of it, then, information concerning causal relationships between manipulable conditions like testosterone levels and diseases is, unlike information about nonmanipulable conditions like ‘being male’, useful when deciding public health policy. It is this thought that drives Hernan and Taubman (2008) to claim that one cannot make claims about causal effects (within the epidemiological context) without specifying at least one well-defined intervention.
Here I criticise what I call the ‘naïve’ interpretation of the POA as a conceptual analysis of causation, by highlighting three objections. The first, which I address in this section, is taken from Alex Broadbent’s (forthcoming) paper on causation and prediction in epidemiology. Broadbent considers Hernan and Taubman’s (two POA theorists) 2008 paper on obesity, in which they claim that no causal questions about the effects of obesity are meaningful. Broadbent takes this paper (along with significant additional evidence) to capture the essence of the POA, identifying four theses he deems advocates of the POA to be committed to: one semantic, one metaphysical, one pragmatic, and one epistemic (Broadbent, forthcoming). In the following section I outline the four theses, and present Broadbent’s objections.
3.2 Broadbent’s Characterisation of Hernan and Taubmen’s Potential Outcomes Approach
The semantic thesis states that our pretheoretic intuitions about causation should be ignored when developing an account of causation within epidemiology, acknowledging that it is the pragmatic consequences of the causal-conception that marks its quality (Broadbent, forthcoming). The semantic thesis thus captures the ‘improving public health’ prescriptive nature of the POA (so there is nothing obviously incoherent about it).
The metaphysical thesis states that ‘…at least sometimes, causes are difference-makers. X is a difference-maker for Y if and only if, had X had been absent or different, then Y would have been absent or different’ (pg X). This is a somewhat weaker version of Hume’s conditional definition of causes quoted in S2, since causes do not (necessarily) always make a difference under the POA criterion - although smoking causes cancer, it might be the case that an individual would have developed cancer regardless of whether or not she smoked (perhaps due to some genetic predisposition). The weakening of the counterfactual thesis maintains the POA’s commitments, without falling foul to obvious objections against anything stronger. This weakening is necessary thanks to the move from singular to general causation (but there is no need to explore this any further).  
The pragmatic thesis states that ‘…the only difference-makers that epidemiology needs to care about are those that are humanly manipulable.’ (pX) This aspect is of course closely linked with the semantic thesis, as prima facie for epidemiologists, usefulness is largely determined by what can humanly be changed. Unlike the semantic and metaphysical theses, Broadbent challenges the pragmatic thesis: 
According to the pragmatic thesis, in order to know whether some condition is causal one must first know whether or not that condition can be (humanly) manipulated. This knowledge, says Broadbent, can only come from one of two sources. The first is background scientific knowledge, but this always involves causes without humanly manipulable interventions. The second is via direct empirical evidence: one attempts to manipulate some condition under investigation, and where one discovers that it does not correspond to a well-defined intervention, one declares it non-causal. Broadbent argues that in order to conduct such an experiment, one needs to have already identified a well-defined intervention, and since one does not know in advance whether an intervention is well-defined, the pragmatic thesis is flagrantly circular.
Finally, the epistemic thesis states that ‘…causal knowledge yields predictive knowledge…. Enabling prediction under hypothetical scenarios is the mark of causal knowledge’ (pX). According to Broadbent this epistemic thesis can also be refuted, this time simply on the grounds that it is demonstrably false. It is undeniable that ‘smoking causes cancer’ is a useful causal claim, yet this knowledge has yielded many false predictions (PgXX).	
In the following section I argue that although Broadbent’s criticism of the Hernan and Taubman (and in particular the pragmatic thesis) is unsurprising, the thesis epidemiologists are predominantly interested in, the semantic thesis, warrants rethinking the pragmatic and epistemic theses such that they avoid the circularity and falsity objections. In the following sections I suggest that applying the Popperian scientific method resolves Broadbent’s worries in a manner I suspect Hernan and Taubman would happily endorse; furthermore, I show that causal knowledge obtained via the POA does in fact always yield at least some predictive knowledge. 
3.3 Diffusing Broadbent - A Popperian Take on the Potential Outcomes Approach
Broadbent’s objection to the pragmatic thesis is predicated on Hernan’s inability to answer ‘how can the epidemiologist know which conditions are humanly manipulable?’ without succumbing to a vicious circle. As we saw, the two possible approaches to answering the question (as identified by Broadbent) are (i) existing scientific background knowledge – but this fails because it involves ‘a large quantity of causes that do not correspond to humanly manipulable interventions’ (pg XX), and (ii) empirical investigation – but this fails as ‘for good empirical enquiry, you need already to have identified a well-defined intervention’ (pg X). However, although Broadbent is right to claim only existing scientific knowledge and empirical enquiry can provide the information, this is not problematic.
	The paper Broadbent focuses on when establishing the POA conceptual analysis questions whether obesity shortens life (Hernan and Taubman, 2008). Hernan and Taubman conclude that obesity cannot be considered a cause because it does not correspond to a well-defined intervention – demonstrable, in this case, because there are many ways to lose weight​[7]​, each of which has a distinct effect on mortality; that is, empirical studies designed to measure death attributable to obesity give different values depending on the mode of intervention. Given that there is no well-defined intervention, obesity is not a condition suitable for causal effect measurement. 
Although the Hernan/Taubman paper is prima facie convincing regarding the non-causal status of obesity, Broadbent points out that ‘…if we [discover whether something corresponds to a well-specified​[8]​ intervention] by empirical investigation, then we cannot have decided in advance​[9]​ whether an intervention is well-specified… Thus we cannot make the question of whether our empirical investigation is a good one depend on advance knowledge of whether the putative causes we are contemplating correspond to well-specified interventions’ (pXXX). 
	My response on behalf of the POAist is that although Broadbent is quite right in his exposition and critique of the empirical strategy employed, such a strategy is only problematic under certain assumptions - the key question being: ‘to what extent must we know that an intervention is well-defined prior to investigation?’. Suppose instead of reading the POA to assume causal factors require ‘confirmed’ well-defined interventions, one is more charitable, and takes Hernan to assume epidemiologists adopt a broadly Popperian strategy; that is, rather than taking any scientific hypothesis to be unequivocally true, they use our best scientific theories to determine which conditions are manipulable, whilst attempting to falsify them. Of course, Broadbent is right in his assertion that observation must come subsequent to theory, but this passage from Popper’s 1972 suggests this fact might not be problematic, but quite usual in the sciences.
‘The belief that science proceeds from observation to theory is still so widely and so firmly held that my denial of it is often met with incredulity… But in fact the belief that we can start with pure observation alone, without anything in the nature of theory, is absurd… Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. And its description presupposes a descriptive language, with property words; it presupposes similarity and classification, which in turn presupposes interests, points of view, and problems.’ (Popper, 1972, 46)
Here, Popper confirms Broadbent’s premise that ‘theory’ (in this case, that the intervention is well-defined) is presupposed when studies are conducted, but Popper does not think scientific investigation is meaningless. On a Popperian, falsificationist view, the epidemiologist can assert that an empirical investigation is a good one if our best scientific theories identify the relevant intervention as ‘well-defined’, whilst maintaining an appropriate level of scepticism (and attempting to falsify the hypothesis through empirical investigation). Of course, this relies on further scientific ‘knowledge’, but the existing scientific knowledge need not be causal, and should be treated in the same Popperian way. Broadbent has thus proven the naïve conception of causation apparently presented by Hernan and Taubman’s fallacious, but a broadly Popperian attitude to scientific investigation diffuses Broadbent’s circularity objection to the POA conception of causation.
	What of the falsity objection to the epistemic thesis - that ‘Enabling prediction under hypothetical scenarios is the mark of causal knowledge’ (pgXX), yet the POA conception of causation regularly yields false predictions? I do not think one should be concerned by this objection, either. On the face of it, the objection is only valid if ‘enabling prediction under hypothetical scenarios’ requires the predictions to come true – of course, perfectly justified predictions can (and often do) turn out false, so this cannot be what Broadbent has in mind. Indeed, the objection is clarified in a footnote. Referring to the false predictions made about what happens when tar in cigarettes is lowered, he states:
‘Strictly speaking… I should say that these predictions were not only false but also bad in some more substantive way. In particular… the implementation of causal knowledge in making those predictions did not constitute checking how one might be wrong, and thus did not by itself amount to a good prediction activity’ (2014, XX)
Although Broadbent is right to highlight the importance of the epistemic thesis in the POA, his refutation relies on his own conditions for what it is to be a good prediction activity. Clearly, true predictions can fall out of a poor prediction activities (wild guesses can turn out to be true), and false predictions can fall out of good prediction activities.  However, if Broadbent’s objection is to hold any weight, he would have to deny the following statement: ‘If, following a population of fast food eaters, one knows via the POA that the counterfactual outcome O(x healthy diet) is a high life expectancy versus actual outcome O(x fast food diet), then one can predict (well) that if a population changes their eating habits from a fast food diet to eating healthily, their life expectancy increases.’ - the causal statement alone does not consider alternative outcomes to the counterfactual scenario, and thus according to Broadbent’s criteria, the prediction activity is a bad one – a counterintuitive conclusion indeed (in fact, the relation between the causal and predictive claims looks to be a matter of logical entailment). Let us consider Broadbent’s example to see why this comes about: 
‘As a descriptive claim, the epistemic thesis is clearly false, as there are plenty of cases where we have what we might call ‘causal knowledge’ but make bad predictions about what will happen under hypothetical suppositions. Smoking causes lung cancer, yet predictions based on the knowledge about what would happen if the amount of tar in cigarettes were lowered, or if smokers took shallower puffs were mistaken’ (pXX). 
Of course, it is obviously fallacious to move from ‘if A then B’, to ‘if C then not-B’ (smoking low tar cigarettes is not the negation of smoking), so it is hardly surprising that this sort of example can be given, and no sensible advocate of ‘causal knowledge yields predictive knowledge’ would permit such an inference. Good prediction activity, when seen from a causal perspective, requires the right causal knowledge. We know that smoking causes cancer versus non-smoking, or smoking less, and, as required by the epistemic thesis, this yields predictive knowledge. Specifically, it enables predictions like ‘if this population stops smoking, they are less likely to get lung cancer​[10]​,’ but there is a limited amount of predictive knowledge that any one causal claim can yield. The predictive knowledge is, in fact, determinately specified by the counterfactual scenarios considered in the POA study: If smoking causes cancer versus not smoking, then one can predict stopping smoking will reduce risk of lung cancer. If taking ibuprofen reduces headache versus taking placebos, then one can predict taking the ibuprofen over the placebo will reduce the headache. The move from ‘ibuprofen reduces headache versus placebo’ to ‘my headache will go away faster if I take ibuprofen, than if I take paracetamol’, however, is a bad prediction activity, as the POA causal claim (remember that POA causal claims are meaningless without specifying a contrast) makes no reference to any counterfactual scenario involving paracetamol. The POA does enable prediction (albeit without guaranteeing the prediction will be true), and given the very nature of POA causal claims, POA causal knowledge always yields some predictive knowledge. Of course, the strategy the POA employs makes it possible for one to be incorrect about effect-measures, as estimations of outcomes under counterfactual scenarios can be very wrong (one might, for example, be completely unaware of some condition that would affect the outcome of the counterfactual scenario), but this is a problem with the POA’s overall strategy, rather than the epistemic thesis. Hernan and Taubman should not, then, be overly worried by Broadbent’s charge, here. 
In S3 I presented the POA as if it were a conceptual analysis of causal effect. Critique of this approach to the POA is warranted, as Hernan and Taubman use the POA demonstrate that obesity is not a suitable candidate for causal effect-measurement - to prove this, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for being a suitable candidate must be offered​[11]​. In S4.1 and S4.2, then, I provide two further objections to Hernan and Taubman’s conceptual analysis of causes, both grounded by the fact that some clearly causally relevant conditions (to the epidemiologist) are not humanly manipulable. In S5 I go a step further, and claim that the POA should not be used as a conceptual analysis of all causes in epidemiology, but should be restricted to those concerning humanly manipulable causes; in other epidemiological contexts, alternative conceptual analyses of causation must be implemented.  
4.1 The Importance of Nonmanipulable Causes
Nancy Cartwright, in her 2010 PSA presidential address criticising randomised controlled trials, demonstrated that in practice, unjustified extrapolations from ‘intervention X works somewhere’ to the claim that the ‘intervention X works in general’ are regularly made. She highlights two instances of nutritional intervention funded by The World Bank. The first was conducted in Tamil Nadu state, India, and comprised providing food supplements, health measures and educating pregnant mothers about how to better nourish their children. The project was very successful, with malnutrition dropping significantly in the region. The same programme was then implemented in Bangladesh - an area with similar problems. Given the success in Tamil Nadu, a POA study would suggest a similar drop in malnourished children elsewhere, but in Bangladesh there was no such drop. So what explains the failure of the inferred general causal claim? Two reasons were proposed: first, ‘food supplied by the project was used not as a supplement but as a substitute, with the usual food allocation for that child passing to another member of the family’ (Cartwright 2010, 13), and second, that ‘the program targeted the mothers of young children. But [in Bangladesh] mothers are frequently not the decision makers… with respect to the health and nutrition of their children’ (pg 13). 
In Bangladesh, then, the background conditions were such that the intervention funded by The World Bank was insufficient to reduce malnutrition, since even with the extra food and education, conditions together sufficient for malnourishment were in place. On the other hand, in Tamil Nadu educating young mothers removed a non-redundant part of the conditions sufficient for their children’s malnourishment (and in many cases, there were no other jointly sufficient causes), so the program was successful. This study implies that in certain circumstances, an alternative causal model to the POA must be employed. 
	As one can see through the example above, an effect is often not determined by a single causal factor – indeed, usually there are several states of affairs that are only together sufficient for the effect. This fact is captured in Rothman’s ‘Sufficient-Cause Model to Epidemiology’ (Rothman et al, 2008, 8), according to which a sufficient cause is represented by a pie chart. If every condition represented in the pie chart occurs, then so does the outcome; each ‘segment’ of the pie represents one necessary causal condition (without which the pie would not be complete), thus, if one segment does not obtain, then neither does the outcome.
	Figure 1 below represents the pie chart for child-nutrition – it shows that the sufficient cause for a well-nourished child includes sufficient food, a well-educated nutrition decision-maker, the correct distribution of the food, and ‘other’ unspecified non-redundant conditions. Each segment of the chart is a necessary condition for good child-nutrition. Prior to the intervention, in both Tamil Nadu and Bangladesh segments of the pie were missing. In Tamil Nadu there was insufficient food and the decision maker (the mother) was insufficiently educated in child-nutrition. The project funded by The World Bank implemented interventions such that the sufficient cause was completed and the child-malnutrition levels dropped. In Bangladesh, however, educating the mothers in child-nutrition and providing food supplements did not have the desired effect, as only one of the absent conditions in the sufficient cause was satisfied. First, because educating the mother did not help with the ‘educated nutritional decision-maker’ condition, and second because although there the project provided sufficient food, the household food was not being distributed in the manner intended.
Figure 1.
	Perhaps the most important lesson here is that a sufficient-cause is unlikely to comprise only humanly manipulable states of affairs - it is highly unlikely, for example that an epidemiologist can, in practice, change the decision-making processes of an entire culture. Even if this were possible, amongst the ‘other non-redundant conditions’ will be factors that are nonmanipulable: the price of healthy food, whether or not there were floods or droughts, and so on. The epidemiologist must, when making decisions about studies to conduct (and what public health policies to suggest), take at least some nonmanipulable causes into consideration.    
4.2 Nonmanipulable Causes and Clinical Decision Making
Cartwright’s example highlights the fact that outcomes and interventions are not the only important factors in assessing the kind of counterfactual epidemiologists are interested in, as additional conditions shape the results of studies. In the obesity example, Hernan and Taubman argue that one should not consider obesity a cause of increased morbidity since obesity does not have a well-defined intervention – ultimately, this is because ill-defined interventions make assessing the counterfactual ‘if she were not obese, she would have lived longer’ impossible, since different interventions produce different truth-values. But the same is true of any intervention in which nonmanipulable factors affect the truth-value of counterfactuals, when these are not well-specified. For example, two people may have the same deadly bacterial infection, but one cannot necessarily state that ‘if the patient ingests penicillin her risk of death is lower’ when important, nonmanipulable conditions like penicillin allergies have been ignored. Thus not only do the interventions need to be well-specified, but nonmanipulable background conditions, too - they ‘make a difference’. The POA may be a thesis about interventions; a thesis driven by what epidemiologists and medical practitioners can actually do to prevent or treat diseases, but there is no questioning the causal relevance of nonmanipulable factors in both epidemiology and clinical medicine.        
5. Conclusions
In this paper I have discussed the POA as a conceptual analysis of causation, and at times referred to it as a naïve view. The motivation for calling the view naïve is straight-forward: the POA is not a suitable candidate for a complete conceptual analysis of cause, even within an epidemiological framework. The structure of the approach provides effect-measures of manipulable conditions, and of course the effects being measured have causes – namely, the well-defined interventions 0,1,2…n, but manipulable conditions are not the only relevant causes in epidemiology. Of course, that the POA provides a means of measuring the effect of one intervention versus another, and does not accommodate nonmanipulable states of affairs, does not rule nonmanipulable states of affairs non-causal. All one can conclude from the method outlined in this paper is that the POA cannot measure the effect of nonmanipulable causes. 
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^1	  I quote Hume rather than Lewis here, as Hume’s work is often seen as the origin of counterfactual conditional accounts of causation – it may seem surprising, then, that I refer to the view as ‘Lewisian’; I call the philosophical counterfactual analysis of causation the ‘Lewisian counterfactual conception’ for two reasons: first, because Lewis’s account is (unsurprisingly, given a couple of centuries’ progress in philosophy) more sophisticated and less open to counterexamples than Hume’s, but second, and more importantly, because Hume provides a regularity approach to causation (for which, it is probably fair to say, he is more often associated with by analytic philosophers) in addition to his counterfactual approach, not at all grounded by counterfactuals (if anything, counterfactuals are grounded by regularities). More on regularity approaches to causation in later sections.
^2	  Of course, and number of complications arise when one analyses causation in this way. Cases of causal-overdetermination and pre-emption for example, lead Lewis to introduce ‘chains’ of causal dependence (Lewis 1973; 2000). An in depth discussion of issues such as causal-overdetermination and pre-emption in the Lewisian conception is beyond the scope of this paper. For further discussion see Peter Menzies’ 1996.
^3	  To be read: The probability/risk of disease given x0 is greater than the probability/risk of disease given x0 
^4	  It seems to me that the Reichenbach analysis itself requires consideration of counterfactuals, but this is work for another paper.
^5	  See Broadbent (2013, pp118-127) for a nice discussion of confounders and the causal fallacy. 
^6	  If the reader is interested in these philosophical issues she should consult Reichenbach’s (1956), and Lewis’s (1973 and 2000) work directly. More detailed expositions of the POA can be found in Rothman, Greenland and Lash (2008, chapter 4), and Greenland (2005)
^7	  Different diets, different exercise routines, smoking, and so on.
^8	 ‘ Well-specified’ and ‘well-defined’ should be taken as synonyms.
^9	  My emphasis.
^10	  This requires the accuracy of our counterfactual suppositions in the POA process of identifying causes, of course, but one must assume this.
^11	  Very crudely, this is what it is to provide a conceptual analysis.
